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ABSTRACT 
The centerline latch tool was designed and developed as an EVA manual 
backup device for latching the Space Shuttle Orbiter's payload bay doors 
for reentry in case of a failure of the existing centerline latches to 
operate properly. The tool was designed to satisfy a wide variety of 
structural, mechanical, and EVA requirements. It provides a load path for 
forces on the payload bay doors during reentry. Since the tool would be 
used by an EVA crewmember, control, handgrips, operating forces, and pro- 
cedures must be within the capabilities of a partially restrained, suited 
crewmember in a zero-gravity environment. The centerline latch tool was 
designed, developed, and tested at the Johnson Space Center to meet these 
requirements. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Space Shuttle Orbiter's payload bay doors are opened soon after 
entering orbit and remain open until just before reentry. The doors are 
opened/closed and latched sequentially, either manually from the on-board 
control panel or automatically from the on-board computer, by electro- 
mechanical actuators. A detailed description of the complex payload bay 
door system is discussed in a paper entitled "Space Shuttle Orbiter Payload 
Bay Door Mechanisms" (Ref. 1) g iven during the 13th Aerospace Mechanisms 
Symposium at Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas. 
The door mechanisms consist of four basic subelements: door drive 
actuation, forward bulkhead latches, aft bulkhead latches, and centerline 
latches (Fig. 1). The door drive system moves the doors to a designated 
position by two actuator systems, one on either side of the payload bay. 
Each system drives one 18.x-meter (60-foot) door and consists of an electro- 
mechanical actuator that drives six gear boxes interconnected by torque 
tubes. Each gear box then rotates the drive linkage to the door. The for- 
ward bulkhead latches connect the doors to the forward structural bulkhead. 
These latches consist of a right-hand gang of four latches and a left-hand 
gang of four latches that operate sequentially. The active latch mechanism 
is mounted on the door, and the mating passive hook rollers are mounted on 
the bulkhead. Each gang of latches is driven by a single electromechanical 
rotary actuator with two motors. In the same manner, the aft bulkhead 
latches operate and connect the doors to the aft structural bulkhead. Finally, 
the centerline latches connect the right-hand and left-hand doors along the 
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centerline. There are four gangs of latches (four latches per gang). The 
active latch mechanisms are on the right-hand door and the passive mating 
rollers are on the left-hand door. The four latches within each gang are 
connected by torque tubes to each other and to a single electromechanical 
rotary actuator. The centerline latch system is shown on Fig. 2 and 3. 
A failure in any of the four basic door mechanisms could require a 
manual EVA operation using one or more specially designed Orbiter door 
closure tools. These tools would disconnect a disabled door or latch 
system and close and secure the doors if the normal system failed. The 
set of EVA Orbiter door closure tools consists of a tubing cutter, a winch, 
a 3-point latch tool, and a centerline latch tool. The tubing cutter, the 
winch, and the 3-point latch tool have been previously discussed in detail 
in a paper entitled "Orbiter Door Closure Tools" (Ref. 2) given during the 
14th Aerospace Mechanisms Symposium at NASA Langley Research Center, Hampton, 
Virginia. 
The basic types of potential failures, their causes, and the required 
EVA actions are described in Table 1. For a door drive system failure such 
that the door can neither be opened or closed, the EVA crewmember uses the 
tubing cutter to cut the upper or lower drive tubes. Once the door drive 
tubes have been cut, the EVA winch rope hook is routed over the number 4 
bulkhead hook roller and attached to the number 4 latch bellcrank at the 
tip of the door. The rope is then reeled back in by the winch until the 
door has been fully closed. If a gang of bulkhead latches on either end of 
one or both doors fails to operate properly, the EVA crewmember uses the 
3-point latch tool to fully close and secure the door. 
CENTERLINE LATCH TOOL 
If a gang of centerline latches on the right-hand payload bay door 
fails to operate properly, the doors must be safely secured by some other 
means. The centerline latch tool is an EVA manual backup device for 
latching the Orbiter's payload bay doors for reentry. Four of these tools 
(enough to bypass one gang of latches) are carried onboard the Orbiter. 
Design criteria required that the tool fit all 16 centerline latches. 
It had to be able to interface with the existing centerline latch mechanisms 
and payload bay doors. The problem of misalignment due to thermal distor- 
tion was also considered. The tool had to close the doors having 5.05 cm 
(1.99 inches) misalignment in the y-axis and 10.97 cm (4.32 inches) misalign- 
ment in the z-axis. Misalignment in the x-axis was considered negligible 
because the four passive shear fittings align the doors in the x-direction. 
The tool provides a load path for y and z forces on the payload bay doors 
to maintain the Orbiter's structural integrity during reentry. 
The centerline latch tool's controls, handgrips, operating forces, 
and procedures had to be within the capabilities of a partially restrained, 
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EVA crewmember in a zero-gravity environment. These design requirements 
are set by the Shuttle EVA Description and Design Criteria Document 
(~~~-10615). Another requirement is that the tool be provided a safety 
tether attach point since it will be transported or handled during EVA. 
The tool also had to retain itself in position while being used by the 
crewmember. 
The centeriine latch tool (Fig. 4) consists of a frame, a screw/nut 
drive assembly turned by a ratchet that pivots in the frame, and the latch. 
The ratchet handle folds down into a stowed position to conserve space. 
The release button, which is used to deploy the tool latch, can be depressed 
from either side of the tool frame. It has a safety catch, also on both 
sides, such that it cannot be inadvertently depressed. The installation 
sequence is shown on Fig. 5. 
INSTALLATION 
The tool is installed by first inserting it on the failed centerline 
hook latch. Then the tool is rotated to brace it in place (Fig. 6). The 
safety catch is removed on the release button to be depressed. When the 
release button is depressed, the tool latch is deployed. The tool latch 
bypasses the existing hook latch regardless of the position of the center- 
line hook latch. The ratchet-handle is now unfolded. In this configuration, 
the crewmember holds the tool and extends the screw by ratcheting until a 
force is applied on the centerline latch passive roller, closing and 
securing the door. The sleeve on the ratchet handle is raised and the 
handle folded to the stowed position. 
One tool is installed on each centerline latch in the disabled gang 
in the same sequence as normal door closure. After installing the last 
tool, the crewmember is ready to reenter to the crew module. 
TESTING 
The centerline latch tool has undergone development and evaluation by 
crewmembers and NASA personnel. Extensive testing and training have also 
been done using the full-scale mockup of the Orbiter in the Weightless 
Environment Training Facility (WETF) at the Johnson Space Center. This 
testing determined that the centerline latch tool was within extravehicular 
capabilities and workload limits. 
A qualification test fixture was also built to simulate the loading 
on the latches. The centerline latch tool was installed on the test fixture 
latches. Then, using a hydraulic cylinder, the tool reacted the loads that 
it would see during reentry. 
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I 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The flight tools are stored onboard the Cargo Bay Stowage Assembly, 
a stowage container located in the payload bay, during the Shuttle flights. 
The centerline latch system is a reliable mechanical system; however, like 
any mechanical system, it is possible that a malfunction could occur that 
could cause an unsafe reentry of the Orbiter. This backup tool will be 
available as a safety device for the Orbiter. 
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TABLE l.- DOOR CLOSURE FAILURES 
TYPE OF FAILURE 
Ok or both doors will 
not close 
Bulkhead latch system 
fails with the 
latch hook greater 
than 37O from the 
closed position 
Bulkhead latch system 
fails with the 
latch hook less 
than 37’ from the 
closed position 
Centerline latch system 
fails with the hook 
latch in any 
position 
Door drive system 
failure 
Door drive system 
failure and jam 
Latch actuator 
fails or jam3 
Latch actuator 
fails or jams 
Latch actuator 
fails or jams 
KTION 
Attach the winch hook to the 
affected door and manually 
close the door. Actuate the 
bulkhead latch system. 
Cut the six drive tubes on the 
affected door with the tubing 
cutter and iaanually close the 
door using the winch. Actuate 
the bulkhead latch system. 
Install the three-point latch 
tool on the end of the af- 
fected door starting with the 
number 1 latch. Proceed in 
order to the number 4 latch, 
closing the door at each 
position before proceeding 
to the next latch. 
Remove the connector bolt from 
the actuator linkage with 
the bolt extractor. Hanually 
backdrive the latch hooks un- 
til the three-point latch 
tool can be installed on the 
number 1 latch; proceed in 
order to the number 4 latch, 
closing the door at each 
position before proceeding 
to the next latch. 
Install the centerline latch 
tool on the affected 
centerline latch. Proceed 
in order to the next 
centerline latch. 
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FIGURE 1. - PAYLOAD BAY DOOR SYSTEM 
MNwAl DlSCoNNECf AT muus A THRll D ILLW 
ACTUATOA (2) MTOUS’ Mlrw CNVE DETENT 
PAssIvE Raw RlMT ooon 
. \ 
TCHES 
FIGURE 2. - PAYLOAD BAY DOOR CENTERLINE 
LATCH SYSTEM 
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FIGURE 3. - CENTERlINE LATCH ASSEHSLY, 
TYPICAL (16 LOCATIONS), 
VIEW LOOKING FUD 
RATCHET 
SLEEVE 
,LATCH 
NUT DRIVE ASSY h!4 II-II t\ l! 
RELEASE BUTTOti J L SAFETY \FRAME 
FIGURE 4. - CENTERLITjE LATCH TOOL 
69 
STEP 1 
INSTALL ON DISABLED LATCH 
STEP 4 
STOW HANDLE 
STEP 2 
RELEASE HOOK 
1 
STEP 3 
EXTEND DRIVE SCREW 
FIGURE 5. - CENTERLINE LATCH TOOL 
INSTALLATION SEQUENCE 
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SPACECRAFT LAUNCH VEHICLE 
EVENT SEQUENCING SYSTEM 
Vincent R. Noel* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper describes the design and operation of a combination of 
explosive devices and mechanisms that are used to provide sequencing signals 
and events for the upper stages of a multistage launch vehicle. The launch 
vehicle is a three-stage vehicle with the Atlas booster as the first stage 
and Thiokol Star 48 solid motors providing propulsion for the 2nd and 3rd 
stages. The lst/2nd stage separation is initiated by redundant discrete 
electrical signals that originate in the Atlas booster. All subsequent 
events are controlled by explosive/mechanical components assembled and 
installed in a subsystem called the Event Sequencing System. No electrical 
power or signal is required for subsequent events. 
The upper stages are designated the SGS-II Stage Vehicle System. 
INTRODUCTION __- 
The Event Sequencing System evolved from a requirement commencing with 
separation from an Atlas E/F booster to perform all functions necessary to 
place a NAVSTAR Global Positioning satellite into a transfer orbit. Two 
tandem Star 48 solid-propellant motors provided sufficient total impulse to 
achieve the necessary apogee velocity. A method of providing the following 
functions in a sequential manner was required: 
1. lst/2nd Stage Separation 
2. Simultaneous Ignition of 8 Spin Gas Generators 
43: 
2nd Stage Solid Motor Ignition 
2nd/3rd Stage Separation 
5. 3rd Stage Solid Motor Ignition 
6. 3rd Stage/Spacecraft Stage Separation 
7. Release of Tumble Weights 
The Event Sequencing System is an integrated system which performs items 
2 through 7. 
&McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, Huntington Beach, California 
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TRADE.STUDIES AND RISK ASSESSMENT 
Three major types of systems were studied for Event Sequencing: Electro- 
mechanical, Electronic and Explosive. Safety, reliability, simplicity of 
design (including telemetry interfaces), cost, weight, flight environment, 
implementation schedule, field station operations and procedures, amount of 
ground support equipment required, and extent of company experience with each 
system were considered. Cost and schedule were of paramount importance. The 
system had to be designed, developed and qualified for flight within one year. 
The major alternative to the explosive/mechanism system was the use of 
electromechanical timers. The complexity of electrical system design and 
checkout, the historical problems associated with electromechanical timers, 
the additional amount of telemetry required, and the severe schedule problems 
involved with electromechanical timers led to selection of the explosive/ 
mechanism system. 
The explosive/mechanism system was selected because it was safe, simple, 
highly reliable, weighed less than competing systems, and could be designed, 
developed and tested within the allotted schedule. The selected system used 
less electrical power, required no telemetry, and eliminated the need for 
field checkout and ground support equipment. 
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
The system consists of components listed below, together with Explosive 
Transfer Assemblies (ETA), and inert parts necessary to connect the components 
together. 
QUANTITY NOMFXCDATURE 
2 l-second delay 
2 2.1-second delay 
2 10.2-second delay 
2 128.4-second delay 
2 141.7-second delay 
2 203.6-second delay 
20 Through-Bulkhead-Initiator (TBI) 
4 TBI Operated Bolt Cutters 
2 TBI Operated Cable Cutters 
4 Separation Plane Initiators (SPI) 
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A functional schematic showing the organization of the components into 
the system is shown in Figure 1 and IA. An exploded view of the SGS-II Stage 
Vehicle System is shown in Figure 2. Figure 3 is a photograph of the SGS-II 
taken during development testing. 
SYSTEM OPERATION 
The system sequencing is initiated by the separation of the lst/2nd 
stages which pulls an activating rod from each of two Separation Plane 
Initiator Mechanisms (SPIM). The SPIM output initiates the following sequence 
of events: 
Sequence 1 
Initiates redundant one-second pyrotechnic time delays whose output is used 
to: 
A. Ignite 8 gas generators that are used to spin the 2nd and 3rd stages and 
the spacecraft to 75 RPM. 
B. Initiate redundant 141.7-second pyrotechnic delays. 
Sequence 2 
Output from the 141.7-second delays initiate: 
A. The second stage Star 48 motor. 
B. Redundant 128.4-second time delays. 
Sequence 3 
Output from the 128.4-second delays initiates redundant bolt cutter mechanisms 
which sever the bolts on a V-band clamp assembly, thus releasing the struc- 
tural attachment between the 2nd/3rd stages. Coiled helical compression 
spring actuators provide the separation force. 
Sequence 4 
The third stage segment of the system is initiated by the separation motion 
which activates two SPIM. 
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Sequence 5 
Output of the two SPIM initiate redundant 10.2-second pyrotechnic time delays. 
Output of each time delay is manifolded to accomplish the following: 
A. Initiate the 3rd stage Star 48 motor. 
B. Initiate redundant 203.6-second time delays. 
Sequence 6 
Output from each 203.6-second delay initiates: 
A. Redundant bolt cutter mechanisms which sever the bolts on a V-band clamp 
assembly, thus releasing the structural attachment between the 3rd stage 
and spacecraft. Coiled helical compression springs provide the separat- 
ing force. 
B. Redundant 2.1-second time delays. 
Sequence 7 
Output from each 2.1-second delay initiates redundant cable cutters which 
release a tumble weight that prevents the expended third stage from recon- 
tacting the spacecraft. 
COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 
Explosive Transfer Assemblies (ETA) 
The ETA consists of a metal-clad explosive core (mild detonating cord) 
assembled into a stainless steel tube which contains all the products of 
detonation. This material is fabricated into ETA lines of the required 
length by adding identical end tips and the appropriate size threaded fitting 
at each end (Figure 4). All explosive material is hexanitrostilbene, 
especially developed for high-temperature applications. The ETA transfers 
the sequencing signal from component to component with a detonation velocity 
of approximately 6000 meters/set (20,000 ft/sec). The ETA can be formed into 
any shape in which a similar piece of stainless steel tubing could be formed 
using a one inch minimum bend radius. Approximately three-quarter million ETA 
lines have been manufactured to date. 
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Through-Bulkhead-Initiator (TBI) 
A TBI is a bar of steel with non-connecting holes bored on its center- 
line from each end. Figure 5 shows a cross-sectional view of a TBI configured 
for an ETA tip input. A high-explosive donor charge is press loaded into the 
cavity against the bulkhead on the input side, and a receptor charge is loaded 
against the bulkhead on the output side. The donor charge is initiated by 
the ETA tip, and resulting shockwaves are transmitted through the bulkhead 
to initiate the receptor charge, which then ignites the TBI output charge. 
The output charge is tailored and sized to a specific objective. The bulk- 
head remains intact and is designed to retain a pressure of 5516 &, 
(8000 PSI) at a temperature of l@OC (300OF). 
Bolt and Cable Cutters 
The bolt cutter (Figure 5) is a self-contained device consisting of an 
explosive cartridge (TBI), a bolt cutter body, a guillotine piston/knife 
blade held and positioned in the body by a shear pin, and.an anvil. In 
operation, the pressure resulting from the output of the explosive charge 
builds up behind the piston/knife blade, causing it to shear the shear pin 
and impact against the anvil. The bolt cutter is used to cut a 0.792 CM 
(.312 IN) diameter A-286 stainless steel stud heat treated to 117 K &2 - 
138K % (170-200 KSI). The cable cutter is similar in operation 
to thgM bolt cutter except that it has a removeable anvil, which allows the 
cutter to be installed on a cable with fixed ends. 
Pyrotechnic Time Delays 
Figure 6 shows the incorporation of Small Column Insulated Delay (SCID) 
fuse into a delay module designed for ETA end-tip initiation. Shock/ 
pressure from an ETA end tip drives a firing pin into a percussion primer, 
and hot gases from the primer ignite a pickup charge on the end of the SCID. 
Burning rate and length of SCID control the length of time delay. The other 
end of the SCID is fitted with a booster charge that produces a high-order 
detonation output to initiate the interconnecting ETA lines and the other 
time delay in the module. SCID fuse is a deflagrating pyrotechnic (32.8 
grains/meter [lo grains/ft]) encased in a continuous lead sheath. It is 
similar in appearance to lead solder. Burning rates of SCID in this appli- 
cation vary from .20 g (.5 E, to 1.38 F (3.5 SEC/IN). 
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TIME DELAY REQUIREMENTS/RESULTS 
The delay limits imposed were a 3 sigma value of + 10% from the 
nominal over a temperature range of 10°C to 26.7Oc (50TF to 8OOF). 
Representative actual time delay periods from production delays are 
shown in Table 1. Pyrotechnic delays are temperature sensitive and tend to 
time out faster at high temperature and slower at low temperatures. Nominal 
times also tend to increase at the rate of 1% to 2% a year as a result of 
aging. 
TABLE 1. TIME DELAY TEST RESULTS 
T DELAY TIME (SEC) 
TEMP 
10°C(500F) 
1.0 
1.01 
1.00 
1.00 
1.01 
1.00 
.99 
-99 
141.7 
146.90 
135.60 
136.75 
139.15 
138.76 
132.56 
138.64 
128.4 10.2 203.6 
127.15 10.95 209.10 2.05 
125.68 lo.98 209.45 2.09 
123.73 lo.69 202.55 2.12 
124.35 10.65 199.50 2.11 
"122.53 lo.84 193.05 2.06 
129.35 10.61 209.65 2.10 
129.40 10.68 203.45 2.13 
125.45 10.21 196.50 2.03 
2.1 
SEPARATION PLANE INITIATOR MECHANISM (SPIM) 
The SPIM is a simple mechanism which performs a very important function. 
The explosive components installed on the second and third stages are 
initiated by redundant SPIM mounted at the separation planes. The SPIM is 
fired by a standard firing pin and percussion primer arrrangement. The 
separation motion between stages cocks the spring-driven firing pin and in 
the same movement releases the sear and allows the pin to drive into the 
percussion primer (Figure 7). The percussion primer initiates a pickup 
charge which initiates a standard ETA end tip. 
A similar design is commonly used on military aircraft escape systems 
for initiation of the escape system and for parachute reefing line cutters. 
The Apollo space vehicle used such devices in its parachute recovery system. 
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SAFETY ASPECTS 
The system met all the range safety requirements of SAMTEC 127-1, 
CHANGE 3, with the exception of Para. x.4.6.4, Volume I, which required 
the use of a remotely controlled safe and arm (-S&A) device in the solid 
motor ignition system. The need for an S&A device was obviated by the use 
of the non-electric SPIM which initiates the motor-ignition explosive trains 
only upon stage separation. 
Inadvertent motor ignition is prevented by the following: installation 
of the output ETA line to the SPIM late in the launch preparation cycle; 
use of a flagged removeable safety pin and safety plug for the output port; 
placement of a shoulder on the firing pin to prevent the pin from being 
pushed in; and installation of integral mounting bracketry on the aft stage 
to prevent the pin from being pulled out except by stage separation. The 
weight of one motor and the space vehicle is greater than the force the 
separation springs provide; therefore, no separation would occur at either 
first/second or second/third separation planes if a clamp band assembly 
inadvertently separated while on the launch pad. 
The use of the SPIM concept was approved by Range Safety and the 
upper stages designated the SGS-II Stage Vehicle System are scheduled to be 
launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in 1982. 
CONCLUSION 
The Event Sequencing System represents a unique application of explosives 
and mechanisms to accomplish operations formerly performed by electromechanical 
and electronic systems. Application of such a system is recommended for 
sequencing events where the timing variations inherent in the system are 
acceptable; and high reliability, safety, relatively low cost and weight, and 
absence of field station checkout and equipment are desired. 
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3. Stage Vehicle Systen 
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